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Abstract   
We study the distributional effects of globalization within a model of heterogeneous agents where both managerial 
talent and knowledge of the local economic environment are required in order to set up a firm in a given country. 
Therefore, agents willing to set up a firm in a foreign country need to incur a learning cost that depends on how 
different is the foreign entrepreneurial environments from the domestic one. In this context, we show that 
globalization fosters FDI and raises wages, output and productivity. Moreover, it benefits workers and highly 
talented multinational entrepreneurs, while harming low-ability domestic producers. The effects of openness 
follow from highly efficient foreign entrepreneurs driving inefficient local firms out of the market. We provide 
empirical evidence consistent with the implications of the model, showing a significant negative effect of the 
distance between nationwide regulations indexes on bilateral FDI flows. 
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  1 Introduction
Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) are one of the predominant and most debated features of
globalization. FDI grew dramatically in the last 15 years of the 20th century, far outpacing the
growth of trade and income: whereas world-wide real GDP increased at a rate of 2.5 percent
per year between 1985 and 1999 and world-wide exports by 5.6 percent, world-wide real inows
of FDI increased by 17.7 percent. Another salient feature of FDI is that they take place mostly
between developed countries, i.e. between countries that are similar in terms of natural endow-
ments and relative supply of inputs. For the period 1970-2000, Barba Navaretti and Venables
(2004) report that more than 90% of outward ows of FDI originates from advanced countries.
Over the same period, the share of the world FDI inows directed to developed countries ranges
between 58 and 78 percent.1 At the same time, a growing body of empirical evidence is point-
ing to the existence of a positive eect of FDI inows on wages and productivity. Baldwin,
Braconier and Forslid (1999) show that FDI positively aect wages using industry-level data
for seven OECD countries. Keller and Yeaple (2003) provide rm-level evidence from the US
showing that FDI spillovers account for about 14% of productivity growth in U.S. rms between
1987 and 1996. Javorcik (2004) provides similar evidence for Lithuania.2
In this paper, we build a very simple general equilibrium model that provides an encompass-
ing explanation of these facts and, at the same time, allows to study the distributional eects of
globalization. In fact, even though there is a general consensus that the process of globalization
is bound to be in the long-run welfare improving, it may still produce winners and losers if
appropriate transfer schemes are not available. This issue, despite its obvious relevance, has
been so far hardly analyzed in the literature.
To this aim, we consider a world of heterogeneous agents where both managerial talent and
knowledge of the local economic environment are required in order to set up a rm and earn
positive prots. The main trade-o that arises in the model depends on how individuals with
dierent abilities are allocated to dierent types of jobs available in the economy.
To be more specic, a rst key feature of the model is that agents with dierent levels of
managerial ability are allowed to choose their occupation, i.e. whether to become entrepreneurs
or workers. Those who become entrepreneurs may, in turn, engage in FDI, i.e. set up a rm
abroad. However, in order to become a successful entrepreneur in a given country, managerial
ability is not sucient: some knowledge of the local economic environment is also required. A
second key feature of the model is that domestic agents are assumed to know the characteristics
of the domestic economic environment (e.g. domestic consumers' tastes) while they ignore the
characteristics of the foreign economic environment and have to learn them if they want to
protably set up a rm abroad. Thus, both managerial ability and nationality contribute to
determine career choices. The idea is that a certain level of managerial talent, though allowing
1Surprisingly, economic theory has been geared mainly towards explaining ows of capital (and goods) among
countries that are dierent. This is clearly the case for Ricardian and Heckscher-Ohlinean models while \new-
trade" models  a la Krugman explain intraindustry trade and investment ows between economies that are ex-ante
similar and ex-post dierent: increasing returns to scale favor specialization and concentration of production (and,
thus, trade). Locations are ex-post dierent because, once specialization has taken place as the consequence of
increasing returns, dierent varieties are produced in each country.
2See Lipsey (2002) for a review of the micro evidence on the home and host country eects of FDI.
2agents to protably produce within the economic domestic environment, may be of little help
when setting up a rm abroad. The more so, the more dierent the foreign and the domestic
economic environments. This distance between entrepreneurial environments is the only explicit
barrier to capital movements that matters in the model. It may be overcome only at the
cost of learning how the foreign environment works. Of course, in equilibrium, only the most
talented entrepreneurs have incentives to pay the learning cost and produce abroad. Thus, the
model endogenously determines the allocation of talents between (domestic and international)
entrepreneurial activity and salaried work. It follows that the pattern of FDI ows and the
levels of Total Factor Productivity (TFP), GDP and wages depend on how eciently talents
are allocated. Talent allocation, in turn, depends on how hard it is to learn how to deal with
the foreign entrepreneurial environment. A lower distance between entrepreneurial environments
reduces the learning cost and raises the inow of foreign-owned rms into the local market. This
increases local wages and makes the entrepreneurial activity less protable, driving a fraction of
low-ability domestic entrepreneurs out of the market. This general equilibrium eect improves
the allocation of talents and increases both TFP and GDP. On the contrary, a larger distance
between entrepreneurial environments protect low-ability entrepreneurs from foreign competitors
and reduce output, wages and TFP.
Summing up, this paper makes the following three points.
1. Globalization, by reducing the distance between entrepreneurial environments (for exam-
ple, by making consumers' taste more homogeneous throughout the world), raises aggre-
gate GDP and TFP, by inducing larger FDI ows. The underlying mechanism works
through the improved allocation of talents in the economy. Thus, globalization fosters
eciency.
2. Globalization has large distributional eects. The individuals with the lowest level of
entrepreneurial talent (who choose to become workers independently of the level of glob-
alization) and the individuals with the highest level of talent (who choose to become
multinational entrepreneurs if the degree of globalization is high enough) are better o in
a fully globalized universe, i.e. an universe where the learning cost is zero and therefore
GDP, TFP and wages are largest.
Dierently, the individuals with an \intermediate" level of talent (i.e. local entrepreneurs
who never choose to engage in FDI and may be even driven out of the entrepreneurial
activity if the degree of globalization is high enough) prefer to live in a non-globalized
universe. The reason is that, in a globalized world, they pay the cost of tougher competi-
tion without enjoying the benets of accessing to wider markets. Only in a non-globalized
world they survive as entrepreneurs as they are sheltered from foreign competitors.
3. Finally, in our model, a lower cross-country distance between entrepreneurial environments
raises the volume of bilateral FDI ows. We test this prediction against the data. We proxy
the entrepreneurial environment using OECD and the World Bank indexes that measure
the level of Product Market Regulation. We match these data with data on bilateral FDI
ows drawn from the OECD International Direct Investment Statistics.
Our empirical specication lies in the tradition of gravity models with an additional ex-
3planatory variable: the absolute value of the dierence between the source and host country
indexes of regulation. We nd that, controlling for the level of regulation in both countries,
countries xed eects, time eects, countries GDP and a set of geographical variables, the
coecient of the variable capturing regulation proximity is negative and in most cases
signicant. We interpret this nding as evidence consistent with the hypothesis that the
distance between nationwide regulations contributes to shape the size of bilateral FDI
ows. Thus, we nd our empirical results suggestive that similarity in entrepreneurial
environment fosters FDI.
Even though these points are strictly interrelated, for the sake of clarity it is convenient
to discuss them (and relate them to the literature) separately. We do so in section 2. In
particular, subsection 2.1 discusses the literature on the determinants of FDI, subsection 2.2 the
literature on allocation of talents, and subsection 2.3 the literature on the distributional eects
of globalization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3 presents the data
and shows that cross-country dierences in regulation aect FDI ows. Section 4 describes the
model economy. Section 5 solves for the closed economy benchmark and section 6 analyzes the
framework where entrepreneurs are allowed to set up rms abroad. Finally, section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
2.1 Cross-country dierences and FDI
An extensive (theoretical and empirical) literature has studied the factors that drive FDI ows.3
The key ndings may be quickly summarized as follows.
First, a host of institutional, technological and market factors aect rms' decision to set up
production facilities in a foreign market.4 Obvious examples are trade barriers, (rm- vs. plant-
level) economies of scale, and market size.5 Second, larger cross-country factor cost dierentials,
generated either by dierences in productivity or in the relative supply of inputs, are typically
associated to larger FDI ows.6 Third, and more importantly for this paper, larger cross-country
dierences along some well identied dimensions, negatively aect FDI ows. Variables like
\smaller physical distance", \sharing a common language" or \sharing a border" signicantly
contribute to determine the size of bilateral FDI ows in gravity-like empirical models (see
Ekholm (1998) and Shatz (2003)). Moreover, Markusen and Maskus (2002) show that the
3See among others Horst (1972), Deardor, (1998), Ekholm (1998), Lipsey (2001), Razin et al. (2003), Shatz
(2003).
4See Barba Navaretti and Venables (Chap 2, 2004) for an in-depth discussion of the benets and costs to the
rm of FDI.
5First, trade barriers encourage horizontal FDI, i.e. FDI aimed at serving a local market, while they discourage
vertical FDI, i.e. FDI aimed at reducing production costs by relocating (part of) the production activities abroad.
Second, multinational rms are likely to be characterized by intangible rm-specic assets from which rm-level
(as opposed to plant-level) scale economies originate. Finally, most FDI are directed toward large markets: as
investing in a given country implies large xed costs, rms are willing to aord it if perspective sales are suciently
large (Brainard (1997)).
6Vertical FDI, that involve the fragmentation of the production process and the relocation of the most la-
bor intensive technologies to relatively low wage countries, typically exploit factor prices dierences. Using US
data, Brainard (1993) and Markusen and Maskus (2001) get some support for the relevance of factor market
considerations as determinants of FDI.
4similarity between host and home factor endowments is one of the main factors driving the
location of foreign subsidiaries (together with the size of the host market).
We focus our attention on the third set of determinants of FDI and (1) provide an explanation
of why smaller cross-country dierences (along some non obvious dimensions) foster bilateral
FDI ows and (2) produce new empirical evidence in support of this nding.7
In our model countries will not dier in terms of factor endowments. Cross-country dif-
ferences will rather lie in a factor that we call \entrepreneurial environment". The following
statement from Unilever's website helps understanding what we mean by \entrepreneurial envi-
ronment":
\Many of our brands have international appeal, while others are leaders in local
markets. It is our keen understanding of cultures and markets that allows us to
anticipate consumers' needs and to provide them with what they need, when they
need it." (Unilever, emphasis added)8
Broadly speaking, one may think of the entrepreneurial environment as representing the
complex set of circumstances, generally dierent across countries, entrepreneurs need to deal
with: identication of consumers' tastes, communication with costumers, relationship with the
bureaucracy, comprehension of the legal environment, purchase of inputs, relationship with other
rms, setup of the production process (hiring and ring procedures, salary structure, technology
choices,...).9
Given this, our reasoning is simple: in each country only some agents become entrepreneurs.
These are the ones that have a combination of managerial ability and knowledge of the local
environment that allows them to protably produce and sell in the domestic country. However,
at least to some extent, knowledge of the local environment also allows to infer the characteristics
of the foreign economic environment. The more so the more similar the two countries. It follows
that smaller cross-country dierences between entrepreneurial environments make it easier for
domestic entrepreneurs to set up rms abroad.
While we describe this mechanism in a formal general equilibrium model (sections 5 and 6),
our contribution, in this respect, is also empirical. We regress bilateral FDI ows on (a set of
controls and) variables that proxy the distance between \entrepreneurial environments". The
variables that we use are indexes that measure the cross-country distance between the levels
of Product Market Regulation. Usually in empirical works, proximity in \regulations" is not
taken into account as one of the possible determinants of FDI. However, our model shows that
it should matter. The reason is that national regulations contribute to shape the economic
environment, because they typically prescribe to follow particular procedures (e.g. business
start-up procedures, administrative rules, safety and health regulations, food regulations). The
7The reason why we do not focus on the rst two sets of determinants of FDI is twofold. First, the channels
through which they shape Ricardian (and \Hecksher-Ohlinean") FDI ows are well understood. Second, the
overwhelming proportion of FDI is horizontal rather than vertical and this implies that typically FDI do not ow
in order to exploit factor price dierences.
8Cite taken from Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004).
9Thus, the entrepreneurial environment is shaped by demand- and supply-side factors. Demand factors are
related to the environment of the downstream market where nal transactions take place, while supply factors
are related to the environment where production take place.
5more the institutional settings (or any kind of law that imposes to comply with some procedures)
are dierent, the more costly the adaptation process to the new environment and the smaller
the incentives to actually run businesses abroad. Thus, rough as it may be, this measure
captures (at least part of) the dierence between entrepreneurial environments and has the
advantage of being easily observable. Interestingly, we nd that the coecient of the variable
capturing regulation proximity is negative and typically signicant. Thus, similarity in the levels
of nationwide regulations does seem to contribute to raise the size of bilateral FDI ows.
We now discuss the role of agents' heterogeneity and how our model relates to the literature
on the allocation of talents.
2.2 Heterogeneity and Allocation of Talents
Our paper is strictly related to the seminal paper of Melitz (2003), who develops a dynamic
industry model with heterogeneous rms to analyze the intra-industry eects of international
trade. As in our paper, also in Melitz (2003) only the most ecient rms export and exposure to
trade forces the least productive rms to exit the market via higher real wages. The key dierence
is that in Melitz (2003) heterogeneity is cast at the rm level: consumers are homogeneous and
there is no endogenous sorting of agents into jobs. In our paper, rms' heterogeneity stems from
the heterogeneity (in managerial talent) of the agents, who are allowed to make career choices.
These features of our model allow to stress the role of the (endogenous) mechanism by which
exposure to foreign competition improves the allocation of talents and, most importantly, to
discuss the distributional implications of globalization.
In order to make the dierences between Melitz (2003) and the present paper clear, let us
stress (again) the link (absent in Melitz, 2003) between globalization and allocation of talents via
FDI. As already explained, in our model agents have both dierent levels of managerial ability
and dierent nationalities. Nationality matters because, given a certain level of managerial
ability, it gives an advantage vis- a-vis foreign entrepreneurs thanks to a better knowledge of
the local economic environment. Once individuals are allowed to make career choices, in each
country the pool of entrepreneurs will consist of individuals with relatively high entrepreneurial
talent. Within the pool of entrepreneurs, only the most talented will set up rms (not only
at home but also) abroad. The issue is how much talent is required in order to become a
local/multinational entrepreneur. It obviously depends on how costly it is to be an entrepreneur
and, in particular, on how costly it is to hire labor.
We make a very simple point. Globalization, by reducing the cost of acquiring information
about the foreign country, spurs FDI ows, increases the demand for labor and, consequently,
raises wages. The increase in wages has two eects. (1) It reduces rms' prots, making the
entrepreneurial activity less attractive per se. (2) It increases the opportunity costs of being
an entrepreneur, making the alternative choice (be a worker) more attractive. The obvious
consequence is that larger FDI ows, by pushing up the cost of labor, drive the least talented
domestic producers out of the entrepreneurial activity. Notice that this happens even in the
absence of the standard pro-competitive eect of FDI that works through lower prices;10 only
10The competition eect is present in almost all the standard IO-based FDI models, since Horstmann and
6the general equilibrium eect, via higher labor demand and higher wages, is at work.
Allocation of talents and FDI ows are therefore strictly related. As only the most ecient
entrepreneurs can aord the cost of learning how the foreign economic environment works and
engage in FDI, larger FDI ows directly improve the domestic allocation of talents and raise
aggregate eciency. Moreover, the eect on eciency is further reinforced by the fact that
larger FDI ows drive bad domestic entrepreneurs out of the market.
A further point that dierentiates this paper from Melitz (2003) is the analysis of the dis-
tributional implications of globalization, to which we now turn.
2.3 The Eects of Globalization: Winners and Losers
To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst paper that uncovers the distributional eects of
globalization. For the sake of clarity, let us consider two polar cases. The case of a Globalized
Universe, where the entrepreneurial environment is identical across locations and therefore na-
tionality is irrelevant; and the case of a National Universe where entrepreneurial environments
dier and nationality is a relevant characteristic.
(1) Globalized Universe. In this world only talent matters: learning costs are zero. The most
talented individuals become entrepreneurs and there exists a critical level of talent that makes
the marginal individual indierent between being an entrepreneur or a worker. An individual
whose entrepreneurial talent lies just below that critical level would choose to be an entrepreneur
only if wages were lower, both because prots would be higher and because the worker option
would be less attractive.
(2) National Universe. In this world the entrepreneurial environments are dierent across
countries and learning how the foreign environment works is costly. For the sake of clarity, let
us consider the case where the cost of learning how the foreign environment works is innitely
large so that FDI are de facto ruled out. In this world only local rms demand labor in the
local labor market. Consequently, wages are lower compared to the Globalized Universe.
Consider now three individuals. In decreasing order of managerial ability:11 Ms Capitalist-
son, Ms Petitbourgeoison and Ms Proletariatson.
The rst one (Ms. Capitalistson) has a large degree of entrepreneurial talent. In the Glob-
alized Universe she invests both at home and abroad while in the National Universe she is a
domestic entrepreneur. On the one hand, she likes the National Universe because wages are
lower and this implies larger domestic prots. On the other hand, she also likes the Globalized
Universe because of the larger investment possibilities. It turns out that if her talent is large
Markusen (1992). In our model product market competition does not increase in the domestic country as a
consequence of foreign competition. We rule this eect out by assuming monopolistic competition and Dixit-
Stiglitz preferences.
11By managerial ability we mean any individual characteristic that helps being a successful entrepreneur.
Talent is one, though not the only one. The ability of raising funds in a world with capital market imperfections
is certainly another; in that case having wealthy parents would be akin to being more talented. In this paper
we will consider managerial ability as exogenous and independent of the economic environment (the degree of
competition, etc.). To see a model where this is not the case (i.e., where the contributions of talent and family
background depend on equilibrium outcomes) see Hassler and Rodr guez Mora (2000). In any case, there is
nothing oensive about having less managerial talent in our model.
7enough she prefers the Globalized Universe.
The second one (Ms. Petitbourgeoison) has a lower degree of entrepreneurial ability. Her tal-
ent level is such that, in the Globalized Universe, she (slightly) prefers to be a worker. Therefore,
in the National Universe where wages are lower, she chooses to become entrepreneur. Thus,
globalization expels her from the entrepreneurial activity and makes her strictly worse o.12
The intuition is simple: from an entrepreneur's point of view, globalization is benecial insofar
it allows to gain access to larger markets. Low-ability entrepreneurs lose from globalization
because tougher competition drives them out of the market and prevents them from reaping the
benets of accessing to larger markets.
Finally, Ms. Proletariatson has even lower entrepreneurial abilities. So low that she chooses
to be a worker independently of the world (Globalized or National) where she happens to live.
It follows that she prefers to live in the Globalized Universe, where wages are higher.
Thus, in a national world dierences in entrepreneurial environments shelter inecient rms.
Even if there is no direct pro-competition eect of FDI, the general equilibrium eect on the
labor market is sucient to expel mediocre entrepreneurs as dierences in the environments
become smaller. Our model predicts that the middle-ability class (i.e. local entrepreneurs that
would not invest abroad anyway) always supports localisms and regional fragmentation while
the end-tails of the ability distribution (i.e. workers and producers willing to engage in FDI)
would rather live in a globalized universe.13
3 Cross Countries Dierences and FDI
The argument presented above (formally presented in the model outlined in section 4) implies
that a lower cross-country distance between economic environments leads to higher bilateral
FDI ows, because it reduces the cost of learning how to deal with the foreign entrepreneurial
environment. This sections provides empirical evidence in this direction. Specically, it shows a
negative relation between bilateral FDI ows and variables that proxy the cross-country distance
between entrepreneurial environments.
From an empirical point of view, a major diculty is that the \distance between en-
trepreneurial environments" is dicult to measure. A good proxy, however, may be represented
by the dierent levels (and types) of regulations implemented in dierent countries. The idea is
that regulation, along its several dimensions, is one of the key determinants, although of course
not the only one, of the entrepreneurial environment. Thus, our working hypothesis will be that
cross-country dierences in the extent of regulation translate into dierences in entrepreneurial
environments. To conduct the analysis, we exploit two datasets, collected by the OECD and
the World Bank, providing country-level regulations indexes and data on bilateral FDI ows.
Panel (a) in gure 1 displays on the horizontal axis the dierence between country i and
country j index of Barriers to International Trade and Investment in the late 90's, as measured
12To see that Ms. Petitbourgeoison is strictly worse o under globalization notice that she is almost indierent
between career choices in the Globalized Universe and becomes entrepreneur in the National Universe. Lower
wages imply that entrepreneurial prots are larger in a National world, so she must be better o in such a world.






























































































(c) State Control over Business En-
terprises
Figure 1: Plots of the regulatory distances between countries i and j against the FDI ows from
country j to country i (1980-1997).
by the OECD, and on the vertical axis the ow of FDI from country j to country i (from
1980 to 1997). The graph shows that bulk of FDI ows lies in the area where the dierence
between regulations is close to zero. The smaller the dierence between regulations, the larger
and the more frequent the bilateral ows of FDI. Panel (b) in gure 1 uses a dierent measure of
regulation, Barriers to Entrepreneurship, on the horizontal axis. On the vertical axis, as before,
the ow of FDI from country j to country i. Again, a smaller dierence between regulations
tends to be associated with larger bilateral FDI ows. Finally, Panel (c) in gure 1 considers
as a third measure of regulation the extent of state control over business enterprises. Also this
graph shows the \triangular" pattern as the previous ones.
These graphs suggest that FDI do not ow from more regulated countries (where one would
tend to think that the rewards from capital are low14) to less regulated economies where one
would think that the rewards from capital are high. If this was the case, we would observe much
larger and frequent FDI ows when the dierence between the regulation indexes is negative.
Rather, it seems that smaller dierences in regulations tend to be associated with larger bilateral
FDI ows.15
Before moving to the regression-based evidence we turn to the description of the data.
3.1 The Data
The data on FDI are drawn from the OECD International Direct Investment Statistics that
provides yearly statistics for OECD countries on international direct investment ows (inows,
outows) by geographical distribution, i.e. to and from partner countries and regions from 1980
to 1997. Data are provided in national currency and have been converted to US dollars using
yearly average exchange rates.
As control variables we use GDP, from the OECD Main Economic Indicators, population
14Unless, of course, regulated countries are poor and have a high marginal productivity of capital. In this case
we should expect these countries to enjoy net FDI inows. Our point is that, in addition to this eect, the ows
seem to depend negatively on the regulatory distance.
15One alternative explanation may be that the negative relation between dierences in regulations and FDI ows
is due to the fact that FDI take place mostly among (rich) non regulated countries that have similar regulation
levels. If this was the case, what would actually foster bilateral FDI is not the regulation proximity between
countries but, rather, their low regulation levels. The empirical analysis that follows controls for the level of
regulation and GDP in each country and therefore allows to reject this hypothesis.
9from the Penn World Tables, and a set of geographic variables that includes: latitude and
longitude of the source and host country; an adjacency dummy (i.e. if countries share common
land borders); a linguistic tie dummy (i.e. if countries share a common language); distance
between (the main cities of the) countries; European Union, North America and Asian dummies;
a NAFTA dummy. The geographical variables are drawn from Frankel, Stein and Wei (1995)
and Frankel and Wei (1998).
Finally, we exploit variables capturing the level of dierent types of regulation implemented
in dierent countries. We use two sets of such variables, one from the OECD (Nicoletti et al.
(2000)) and one from the World Bank (available at http://www.doingbusiness.org/).
The OECD dataset consists of indexes measuring the extent of Product Market Regulation
in a number of OECD countries during the 90's. It provides both an overall index of Product
Market Regulation and a set of sub-indexes measuring the extent of regulation along particular
dimensions, namely Barriers to international trade and investment, Barriers to entrepreneur-
ship, State control over business enterprises, Administrative regulations, Economic regulation.
Of particular interest for our purposes are the indexes capturing mostly administrative burdens
and red tape costs (Administrative regulations and Barriers to entrepreneurship), i.e. all those
bureaucratic procedures whose knowledge is an essential prerequisite in order to be able to set up
a rm in a (foreign) country. In what follows we will be exploiting the whole set of sub-indexes.
Though some of them are clearly highly correlated, others, like Administrative regulations and
Barriers to international trade and investment display very low correlation (see Table 2 in the
appendix).
The World Bank, on the other side, provides a comprehensive database, called Doing Busi-
ness, collecting information on business regulations and their enforcement, especially on small-
and medium-size domestic rms, for 145 countries. The dataset we exploit refers to January
2004. The available indicators cover seven major areas, namely Starting a Business, Hiring and
Firing, Registering Property, Getting Credit, Protecting Investors, Enforcing Contracts, and
Closing a Business. For each of them dierent indexes are provided. Some indicators (like Num-
ber of procedures to register a business or Index of employment law rigidity) aim at measuring
the eect of actual regulation on businesses, while others (such as Time and cost to register a
business, enforce a contract, or go through bankruptcy) are measures of regulatory outcomes.
Table 3, in the appendix, displays the full set of available variables.
Of course, these measures of regulation are far from perfect. Ideally, one would like to
have time-varying information on whether regulations are qualitatively dierent among coun-
tries rather than just quantitatively dierent. The problem may be that two countries where
the number of procedures to start up a business is the same may require very dierent tasks
to be complied with. However, since quantitative dierences in the amount of regulation plau-
sibly come together with qualitative dierences, these data allow to capture, at least partially,
qualitative dierences as well.
103.2 Empirical Results
In order to check whether the patterns highlighted by the graphical analysis are robust to a
more thorough empirical analysis, we run a battery of regressions in the tradition of gravity
models, adding additional explanatory variables like the regulation level and the absolute value
of the dierence between the source and host country indexes of regulation.
We estimate the following model:
Fijt = i + t + Xijt + jregi   regjj + "ijt (1)
where Fijt is the FDI ow from country j (the source) to country i (the host) at time t, as a
share of the GDP of the host country; i is a (host) country xed eect; t is a year eect;
the vector Xijt includes variables, such as the source and host countries GDP (in US dollars);
the source and host countries population; the latitude and longitude of the source country;16
the distance between the main cities of the two countries. Dummy variables are included to
control for country i and j sharing the same language; sharing common land borders; both
belonging to the European Union; being both located in North America; being both located
in Asia; both belonging to the NAFTA. These geographical variables are meant to capture the
proximity-concentration trade-o (Brainard (1997)).
Finally, we control for the level of regulation in both the host and source country by exploiting
a time-varying index of Employment Protection Legislation measured (Nicoletti et al. (2000))
in 1990 and 1998. This is the only available measure of regulation that varies over time. It
allows to control for the level of regulation also in the host country where non time-varying
characteristics are otherwise captured by the xed eect.17
Controlling for the level of regulation, the coecient  captures exclusively the eect of
regulation proximity, as measured by the absolute value of the dierence between regulation
indexes, on FDI bilateral ows.
We perform our analysis on a set of 22 countries, for which we have data on both regulation
indexes and FDI ows, listed in Table 1 (see appendix). Tables 4, 5, 6 and 7 report the results
of the estimation.
Table 4: results using the OECD regulation data
Table 4 presents the results from the estimation of equation (1) obtained exploiting the OECD
regulation variables. Columns A{H report the results of eight alternative specications diering
in the measure of regulation proximity included on the right hand side. In column A we use
the overall index of Product Market Regulation and, from column B to column H, we exploit
the sub-indexes that focus on particular dimensions of product market regulation. In each
specication, the regulation levels of the source and host country are controlled for by the
time-varying regulation measure of EPL described above.
The rst two rows of table 4 report the coecients of the regulation levels that have, as
16The latitude and longitude of the host country, as well as any other non time-varying characteristic of the
host country, are captured by the xed country eect i.
17Results are unchanged if one controls for the regulation level exploiting other measures of regulation.
11expected, negative signs.18 The remaining rows of table 4 show the coecients of the dierent
indexes that measure the distance between regulations. The coecients of all variables mea-
suring the regulatory distance across countries are negative and signicant at the conventional
signicance levels.
Tables 5, 6 and 7: results using the World Bank regulation data
These tables report the results from the estimation of equation (1) using the World Bank Doing
Business 2004 dataset. The coecients of the World Bank indexes of regulation proximity are
all negative (except one) and typically signicantly dierent from zero.
Table 5 shows that the distance in regulations that measure the diculty of Starting a
Business and the diculty of Hiring and Firing are all negative and signicant except the
variable Minimum capital to start a business (% of income per capita). Table 6 shows that
higher similarity in regulations concerning Property Registration also has a positive eect of
FDI inows as both the Number of procedures to register a property and the Number of days
to register a property enter negatively and signicantly. Dierently, the results on the eect of
dierences in the Credit system are mixed as the Index of legal rights of borrowers and lenders
and Coverage of private registry are negative and signicant while the coecients of the other
variables, though negative, are not signicant. This may reect the fact the multinationals have
easier access to credit to and may also rely on internal capital markets. Finally, Table 7 suggests
that, while dierences in the index of Investor Protection is not signicant, a larger distance
in the procedures related to Contract Enforcement reduces the inows of FDI. Finally, larger
dierences in the Bankruptcy procedures do not matter for FDI.19
Economic signicance
As our regulation variables are, in many cases, indexes with no natural scale, the magnitude
of the coecients is not per se informative of the potential impact of regulation proximity on
FDI ows. Therefore, we have calculated the so-called \beta" coecients, reported in table
8 along with the sample means and standard deviations. A beta coecient is given by the
product of the estimated coecient and the standard deviation of its corresponding independent
variable, divided by the standard deviation of the dependent variable. It converts the regression
coecients into units of sample standard deviations and is equivalent to a regression where all
variables are previously divided by their standard deviations.20
The magnitude of the beta coecients reported in table 8 suggests that regulation proximity
has a non negligible impact on FDI ows. For instance, a one standard deviation decline in the
distance between Barriers to Entrepreneurship raises the ratio of FDI to GDP of as much as
7.81% of its standard deviation. This number is not small as, in the same regression, the beta
coecient of the linguistic tie dummy (sharing the same language) is a very similar 0.08. The
beta coecients of the remaining independent variables in each of the dierent specications
18Only the coecient of the source country regulation level is statistically signicant, because of the presence
of the host country xed eect and the little time variation of the regulation index.
19Also in tables 5, 6 and 7 the regulation levels enter with a negative sign for both countries, but only the
coecients of the source country are statistically signicant.
20Wooldridge (2003, Section 6.1).
12are not reported for brevity and are available upon request. However, the broad picture that
emerges suggests that the magnitude of the eect of the regulation proximity variables is, in
general, comparable to that of the other proximity variables usually included in gravity-like
models.
Therefore, the overall evidence suggests that, along some dimensions, dierences in regula-
tions may matter i.e., controlling for the level of regulation, a smaller distance between national
regulations fosters bilateral FDI ows. In particular, we nd that the distance between regu-
lations concerning Product Markets, Labor Markets (with some emphasis to be placed on ring
restrictions), and Contract Enforcement plays a prominent role in shaping bilateral FDI ows.
Notice that these regulations have to do with the way entrepreneurs have to set up rms. For
example, product market regulations typically imply the existence of particular start up pro-
cedures one needs to comply with in order to start a business. Labor market and contract
enforcement regulations may forbid (or allow only for) certain types of contractual arrange-
ments to be stipulated with workers and/or suppliers. Thus, entrepreneurs need to know these
prescriptions in order to set up a rm.
The next section presents a simple general equilibrium model, consistent with the above
empirical evidence, that allows to study the distributional eects of globalization.
4 The Model
4.1 Demand and Production
There are two political entities (countries). In each of them agents have Dixit-Stiglitz preferences
on the mass of products sold in their country. The demand for good j is:
xj = Y p 
j
where Y stands for aggregate demand in the country,  is the constant demand elasticity and
pj is the price of the good. We normalize the price of the \aggregate" good in each country
to 1. All goods are consumed in the country where they are produced.21 Entrepreneurs (who
can be either national or foreigner) set up rms and face a monopolistic environment. All rms
produce with constant returns to scale using only labor. They maximize:
max
pj
(pjxj   awxj) = Y p 
j (pj   aw)
a being unit labor requirements. Thus, gross prots (gross of xed costs, as explained below)
and productive labor demand (productive as opposed to total labor demand, as again explained
21In appendix C we relax this assumption and assume that a tradable good is produced by perfectly competitive
rms in the context of a two-sector model.
















In the rest of the paper we assume without loss of generality that  = 2 and a = 1
4. Gross prots








4.2 Entrepreneurs and net prots
Agents are heterogeneous and dier in their ability to run businesses. Each agent faces a career
choice. She has to decide whether to become a worker or an entrepreneur. Agents choosing to
become entrepreneurs set up a rm and produce a good that enters symmetrically in the utility
function of consumers, generating the demand presented above. We assume that entrepreneurs
need to pay in every period a xed cost in order to run their business. This xed cost takes the
form of hiring a number of workers , on top of the productive labor demand in equation (5).
The cost  is the source of heterogeneity and determines the career choice.
The idea is that in the day-by-day running of the rm, entrepreneurs face options and have
to take decisions. In order to take the right decision two types of abilities are required. The rst
is managerial talent: good entrepreneurs are better able to solve problems and therefore make
larger prots. The second type of ability is related to the entrepreneurial environment. Given a
certain level of managerial talent, entrepreneurs with a deeper knowledge of the entrepreneurial
environment are able to take better decisions. We think of the entrepreneurial environment as the
set of factors that shape the economy primarily (though not uniquely) through its demand side.
Examples are cultural factors, language, tastes, but also regulations (e.g. dierent procedures
to start up businesses) or any other factor that does not directly aect technology. Therefore,
it is quite natural to think that entrepreneurial environments dier across countries and that
entrepreneurs that have \local" knowledge have an advantage vis- a-vis entrepreneurs who do
not have this knowledge.
We model these two types of entrepreneurial abilities (talent and local knowledge) by as-
suming that, in each period t, agents need to take two actions. In each case the \right action"
is a number in the real line:
rt 2 R
t 2 R
Both rt and t are random variables. In order to guess rt, managerial talent is required; in order
14to guess t, it is useful to have local knowledge.22
Entrepreneurs do not know the precise value of rt and t and take decisions based on their
available information. The further away their action from the \right action", the larger the num-
ber of \unproductive" workers that are hired. That is, the expected number of \unproductive"
workers  is:
E() = E (rt   a)
2 + E (t   b)
2
We now specify the information set available to producers.
Information on rt. We assume that all producers know that rt is a normally distributed
random variable, with independent draws over time, that has a certain known mean (whose
value is irrelevant) and a variance Vr. In each period, before taking decisions, each entrepreneur
receives an unbiased signal on rt. The precision of the signal determines the ability of the
entrepreneur. High-ability entrepreneurs receive more precise signals and make on average fewer
mistakes.
If the precision of the signal received by the entrepreneur is , the variance of the posterior
is 1
1
Vr +. Given that the optimal action is to choose a equal to the expectation of rt, it is clear
that:





Agents dier because they receive signals on rt with dierent levels of precision. More talented
entrepreneurs have larger precision (lower variance) and they expect to take, on average, more
correct decisions. Consequently, they expect to hire fewer \unproductive" workers: the number
of \unproductive" workers is decreasing in the talent of the individual.
Information on t. Agents do not receive signals on the value of t. Rather, they know that
it evolves according to the following process:
t =  + ut
where  is a country-specic constant and ut is an individual-specic white noise disturbance
with zero mean and variance equal to u. Agents take decisions before the realization of the
shock ut. We assume that domestic producers know  and therefore they are only left with the
residual uncertainty implied by the presence of the shock ut. Therefore, due to the uncertainty on
t they hire, on average, only u \unproductive" worker as, from their perspective, V ar(t) =
V ar(ut) = u.
Foreigners, instead, do not know the exact value of  and have to learn it by observing its
realization over time. They have a prior on it, with a certain precision Pt.23 The variance of the
22The assumption that the two decisions are separated and that each requires a dierent type of ability is a
useful analytical simplication. It is possible to specify a model where a single decision is taken at the cost of
getting a much more involved learning process without gaining further insights.
23Notice that the prior is, in our model, a measure of the distance between entrepreneurial environments, as it
tells how much foreign agents know about the domestic environment, before starting the learning process.
15beliefs of foreign producers on t is 1
Pt + u. Consequently,







At the end of each period agents learn the realization of t and update their beliefs. As ut has
variance equal to u, after having observed the realization of t for s periods the precision is:
Pt+s = Pt + s 
1
u
Over time foreign producers learn the exact value of , as their precision becomes innite, and
the expected number of \unproductive" workers to be hired because of the imperfect knowledge
of the entrepreneurial environment converges to u, which is the expected amount hired also by
domestic entrepreneurs.
We index talent by  and label V ar(rt)+V ar(ut) = 1
1
Vr + +u  , with  being distributed
according to some CDF F (). This implies that:






In order to have a suitable benchmark when we allow for cross-border activity, the next
section solves for the closed economy equilibrium.24 In this case, as domestic producers know
how to deal with the entrepreneurial environment (i.e. they have innite precision on ), we
have that E() = V ar(rt) + V ar(ut) = . Therefore the expected net benets and total labor







w2 +  = z + 
It is useful to notice that:
E[()] = (z   )w
As standard, we assume that no individual can be entrepreneur and worker at the same time.
5 Closed Economy Equilibrium
At the aggregate level the only relevant price is the wage rate. Given a certain wage, agents are
going to choose to become entrepreneurs if and only if:25
w  E[()] ,   z   1
24Section 6 solves for the open economy.
25We assume the existence of perfect capital markets, so that only the expected prots (and not the actual
prots) are relevant.
16Assuming a continuum of agents of mass one, the mass of agents that will choose to be en-
trepreneurs is F (z   1). Hence, labor supply and demand are:
LS (z) = 1   F (z   1) (6)




Notice that en lieu of expressing supply and demand as a function of prices, we express them as
a function of rms' productive labor demand (z). We do so for simplicity; z is a monotonously
decreasing function of the wage rate, and expressing everything in terms of z simplify matters.
An increase in z means that labor has become relatively cheaper relative to Y (thus labor
demand goes up and supply down), and it is therefore convenient to think of z as of how cheap
labor is.
Equilibrium is attained when (1) career choices (being an entrepreneur or not) are optimally
taken; (2) the labor market clears (labor demand equals the mass of workers); (3) aggregate
demand equals the total income generated in the economy. We will refer to the last two conditions
as to the labor market equilibrium and the goods market equilibrium.
5.1 Labor Market
In what follows we are going to maintain the hypothesis that  (the inverse of talent) is uniformly
distributed in [0;1].26 Hence, from (6), labor supply reads as follows:
LS (z) = minfmax[2   z;0];1g





0 If z < 1
1
2 (z   1)(3z   1) If 1  z  2
z + 1
2 If 2 < z
In equilibrium it must be that 1  z  2, because if 2 < z labor supply is zero while if z < 1
labor demand is zero. Therefore, the condition LD = LS boils down to:
3
2









10; which does not mean anything by itself). What is interesting is that z (how
cheap is labor relative to the output of the economy) is the only variable that aects the labor
market. This property will turn out to be very useful later on.
26Appendix C solves the model using a general CDF.
175.2 Goods market
In equilibrium, aggregate demand Y must be equal to the total output of the economy. Total
output per rm equals the sum of gross prots
 
 = Y
w = z  w

and the wage bill (z  w),27
hence it equals 2zw. There are F (z   1) rms, thus the goods market equilibrium condition
reads as follows:
Y = 2F (z   1)zw
and therefore, any equilibrium price needs to be such that w = 2F (z   1). Given the assumption
that the distribution of talent is uniform:  s U (0;1):
w = 2(z   1)
Thus, z (how cheap it is labor) completely characterizes the equilibrium and it is pinned down
solely by the labor market clearing condition. For later reference it is useful to observe that, given













6 The open economy
We now turn to a world where entrepreneurs are allowed to set up rms abroad,28 i.e. engage
in FDI.29 In this setting, entrepreneurial ability is country-specic. Each country is assumed to
be characterized by a dierent entrepreneurial environment and talent is dened as the ability
to deal with the domestic environment. Thus, in order to successfully set up a rm abroad,
entrepreneurs need to learn how the foreign entrepreneurial environment works. As explained
in section 4.2, we model the learning cost as an extra amount of \unproductive" workers to be
hired in order to run the rm properly. The expected number of \unproductive" workers is, in
each period, equal to u + 1
P0+s 1
u
where s is the time elapsed since the foreign entrepreneur
started producing abroad and Ps = P0+s 1
u is the precision after observing the realization of
t for s periods. We denote the expected present value of the learning cost of a rm that starts






Finally, we assume that entrepreneurs who set up a plant abroad incur in an additional cost
that requires hiring an extra amount  of workers. This assumption captures the idea that
27Gross prots are then split between entrepreneurs' income and the xed costs.
28We rule out trade. For a model of FDI and trade see Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2003).
29We focus on \horizontal" FDI, i.e. investments aiming at establishing production facilities in a foreign country
in order to serve the local market by making use of the local workforce. In other words, we restrict to goods
that need to be produced in the same geographic location where they are consumed. One can think either of
rms providing services, or rms facing substantial trade costs. As discussed in section 2.1, there is a general
consensus that the overwhelming proportion of FDI is horizontal rather than vertical. We rule out both the
licensing alternative (on this see Ethier (1986), Horstmann and Markusen (1987), and Ethier and Markusen
(1996)) and \vertical" FDI, in which the production process is fragmented across countries (on this see Helpman
(1984), Helpman (1985), Markusen (2002, Ch. 9)).
30Notice that, provided that  < 1, P0 > 0 and u is nite, the expected present value of the learning cost is a









s < 1 because starting from some nite s each
element of the rst series is smaller than the corresponding term of the second (converging) series.
18foreign entrepreneurs are less ecient than domestic ones (with the same level of talent) due,
for example, to the diculty of monitoring workers abroad. Thus, expected per period prots
are E[t()] =







We focus on steady state analysis and characterize the values of the three possible career choices
that each individual faces:
1. Be a worker.
2. Be a domestic entrepreneur.
3. Be a multinational entrepreneur.
In steady state, the value of being respectively a worker and a domestic entrepreneur, denoted









where  is the subjective discount factor. The above asset equations simply state that the values
are equal to the present discounted values of the future streams of wages and net prots. The
value of being a multinational entrepreneur and having already learned how the foreign country
works, is:
VX = VN +
1
1   
(e z      e ) e w (10)
where the variables with a tilde refer to the foreign country. In equation (10) the rst term of
the right hand side is simply the value of being a domestic entrepreneur while the second term is
the value of being a multinational \educated" entrepreneur, thus it accounts for the extra xed
cost e  associated to FDI and not for the learning cost.
Finally, the value of becoming a multinational entrepreneur that still has to bear the learning
cost in order to set up a rm abroad is:




(e z      e ) e w   C(;P0;u)e w
Where C(;P0;u)e w is the present discounted value of the learning cost. Given that the cost
decreases over time, no agent will produce abroad for some time only: if an agent sets up a rm
abroad, it is forever.
196.1.1 Steady State Decisions
Using the above asset equations, we rst look at the decision of individuals who have not
been FDI entrepreneurs in the past and have therefore not learned yet how the entrepreneurial
environment works in the foreign country. Then, we will analyze the decisions of the agents who
already know how to deal with the foreign country environment.
 Individuals who have not engaged in FDI,
{ will choose to be workers if and only if31
z   1  
{ will choose to be domestic entrepreneurs if and only if:
e z   e    (1   )C(;P0;u)    z   1
{ and will change their mind and set up a rm abroad if and only if
  (e z   e )   (1   )C(;P0;u)
 Individuals who have been running a rm abroad in the past (or that for any circumstances
do not need to pay the learning cost) have a dierent decision scheme.
{ They become workers if and only if:
z   1  
{ They become domestic entrepreneurs if and only if
e z   e     z   1
{ And continue being multinational entrepreneurs if and only if
  e z   e 
Notice that agents with  2

(e z   e )   (1   )C(;P0;u);e z   e 

will be engaging in FDI only
if they have been doing so in the past, but will be domestic entrepreneurs otherwise.
If in steady state any agent who could be a multinational entrepreneur is actually one, then
individuals split up among the three categories according to the following rules:
31The actual restriction is max
n
z   1;(z   1)
w
w+ e w +
 




 . However, in
what follows we will focus on the case where the set of domestic entrepreneurs is non-empty for any level of the
learning cost. This happens whenever e z   z  e    1 (which simplies to 1  e  under symmetry). In this case, it
is easy to see that the above condition boils down to the one presented in the text.
20z   1  (Workers)
e z   e    (1   )C(;P0;u)   z   1 (Domestic entrepreneurs)
  e z   e    (1   )C(;P0;u) (Exporting entrepreneurs)
In order to simplify notation we dene a variable C capturing the discounted value of the future
stream of learning costs: C = (1   )C(;P0;u).
Notice that in this model individuals live forever. For this reason, in steady state there are
no ows in and out of the dierent states. However, all our results carry over if we extend the
model and assume an overlapping generations structure where individuals die with at a certain
rate and newborns enter (at the same rate) with a random level of talent.
We now turn to the analysis of the labor market equilibrium and of the goods market
equilibrium.
6.2 Labor market
In a symmetric steady state countries have the same aggregate income Y and the same wage
rate w. The labor supply, in each country, is given by the total number of individuals who
choose not to be entrepreneurs:
LS (z) = 1   F (z   1)
The labor demand is given, in each country, by the sum of (i) the demand for labor of national
entrepreneurs (ii) and the demand for labor of foreign entrepreneurs operating in the country.




(z +  + )dF () +
Z z 1
0
(z + )dF ()
= [z +  + E (j  (z   ( + C)))]F (z   ( + C)) +
+[z + E (j  (z   1))]F (z   1)
where
R (z  C)





0 (z + )dF () is the labor demand of domestic producers, denoted by Ld
D.
Notice that a drop in C (lower learning costs) aects the demand for labor via two margins.
On the one side, a lower C induces a larger amount of foreigners to engage in FDI, thus in-
creasing the domestic labor demand (extensive margin). On the other side, the marginal foreign
entrepreneurs (and only the marginals) need to hire less workers (intensive margin) because the
xed cost C is lower.32 However, the net eect on labor demand of a decrease in C is clearly
positive.33 Recalling that talent is uniformly distributed ( s U (0;1)) and that the number of
32Notice that a larger C would aect labor demand only through the extensive margin because in that case
a lower amount of foreigners would engage in FDI, leaving unaltered the labor demand of those who keep being
multinationals.
33The xed cost  aects the demand for labor as well, not only by changing the proportion of foreign agents
who decide to produce in the home country (very much as the learning cost C ), but also by aecting the labor
demand of all foreign producers (and not only the marginals).
21entrepreneurs is bounded between zero and one, the labor demand is:




[maxfminf(z   (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 + C));1g;0g]
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0 If z < 1
1
2 (z   1)(3z   1) If 1  z  2
z + 1









0 If z <  + C
1
2 (z      C)(3z +    C) If  + C  z  1 +  + C
z +  + 1









is increasing in z (how cheap labor is). The domestic
labor demand is larger than the foreign if labor is relatively expensive (low z), while if wages
are low (high z) the foreign labor demand is larger, because foreign rms need to have larger
stas to operate ( > 0).
When z  2 labor is so cheap that all domestic agents want to be entrepreneurs, at least
locally. This, of course, cannot happen in equilibrium. When z  1++C labor is even cheaper
(recall that  > 1) and therefore everybody would like to engage in FDI, which again cannot
happen in equilibrium.
Let us now turn to what can happen in equilibrium. Given our assumption that the cost of
operating abroad is large enough ( > 1), the shape of total labor demand depends on the size
of  + C.
We rst analyze the case of a relatively high ( + C > ZA). Notice that, in this case, when-
ever z is lower than  +C (labor is very expensive) the total labor demand equals the domestic
labor demand, which is equal to the autarchic labor demand ZA. Thus, not surprisingly, for
relatively high xed costs (and relatively high means precisely that  + C > ZA) the economy
is de facto in autarchy. This can be seen in gure 2 (panel (a)). Foreign entrepreneurs demand
labor in the home country only if it is very cheap, z >  + C, so their presence has no eect in
equilibrium.
We now turn to the case where the costs of opening a plant abroad are not so high ( + C < ZA).
22The total labor demand is now, in the relevant range, the sum of both domestic and foreign
demand, as in panel (b) of gure 2. In that case, in equilibrium, both domestic and foreign
entrepreneurs hire labor in the home country.
Since in equilibrium it can not happen neither than z > 1+ +C (because then everybody
would want to be a multinational entrepreneur) nor that z > 2 (because then everybody would
want to be a domestic entrepreneur), the equilibrium condition reads as follows:
LS = LD
(2   z) =
1
2
(z   1)(3z   1) +
1
2
(z      C)(3z +    C)





(1 +  + 2C) +
q
(1 +  + 2c)
2 + 6(   C)( + C) + 18

The value of z in equilibrium is then:
z =
(
ZT (;C) If  + C  ZA
ZA Otherwise
Notice that when foreign producers actually hire in the home market, the labor demand cannot
be smaller than in autarchy (see again gure 2), while labor supply is not aected by the possibil-
ity of cross-border investments. Thus it is clear that, in any equilibrium with multinational en-
trepreneurs (i.e. whenever +C < ZA), (1) labor is relatively more expensive (ZA  ZT (;C))
and consequently (2) the number of workers is larger (the number of entrepreneurs smaller)
than in autarchy.
The mass of agents that become entrepreneurs is smaller in each country if, in equilibrium,
some (high-ability) agents invest across borders. This, anyway, does not mean that the number
of rms that sells to consumers is going to be smaller, because entrepreneurs from both countries
serve them.
6.3 Goods Market
In equilibrium, in each country total production must be equal to the income of its inhabi-
tants (earned either at home or abroad), or equivalently, the income generated in each country
(independently of the country of the earner) has to be equal to the total production, i.e.:
Y = F (z   1)2zw + F (z      C)2zw
which implies that:
w = 2  [F (z   1) + F (z      C)]
Thus, the wage is a linear function of the number of entrepreneurs that operate in the country.
236.4 The Distributional eects of Globalization
In this section we analyze the implications of the model concerning the distributional eects of
globalization. We compare the steady states of two worlds with dierent values of C (in the
introduction we deemed them as the Globalized Universe (low C) and the National Universe
(high C)) and ask in which world an individual with a certain  would choose to be sent.
















It is not surprising that a larger learning cost determines a smaller equilibrium number of foreign
entrepreneurs (equation (13)). Less obvious is that this will reduce wages (equation (14)) and
increase the gross prots of rms (equation (16)). We plot the above functions for a particular
value of  ( = 1:1) in gure 3.
A larger C reduces the wage rate because it induces some foreign producers not to engage
in FDI. This reduces the domestic labor demand and the wage rate. In turn, this induces
a positive proportion of (high-ability) domestic workers to become (local) entrepreneurs, thus
partially osetting the drop in labor demand. Despite this, the net eect on the wage rate is
negative. Thus, workers prefer to live in a more open universe, i.e. one where entrepreneurial
environments are more similar.
A larger C also implies that, in equilibrium, both the average and the marginal rms are less
ecient. First, some very ecient foreign producers are expelled from the local market. Second,
a positive mass of domestic workers with low entrepreneurial talent turn to the entrepreneurial
activity, further lowering aggregate productivity.
Moreover, in case of large dierences in the entrepreneurial environment (high C), aggregate




could in principle be either larger or smaller,
as both revenues and costs are lower. Nevertheless, the wage eect is larger, implying that
a larger C raises gross prots. The eect on net prots varies across the dierent types of
entrepreneurs. The net prots of local producers (i.e. of agents that keep being local and do
not start engaging in FDI) are larger the larger C, because the xed cost  does not depend on
the learning cost, and, being wages lower, the total xed cost w goes down. Thus, for local
entrepreneurs the increase in net prots is larger than the increase in gross prots.
As to foreign producers, the eect of this would-be exercise of considering a larger C is clear.
A very talented individual facing the choice of which world to choose, would rather live in the
world with the lowest level of C. The reason is that, once landed in this world, this individual
would like to engage in FDI and would therefore suer from a large C, because the negative
direct eect of C on net prots more than osets the increase in gross prots.
24Summing up, workers and talented entrepreneurs that engage in FDI prefer to live in a world
with the lowest possible level of C. Dierently, local producers prefer to live in a world with a
high value of C.34
Finally, note that with lower cross-the-border investments, even if the mass of agents that
become entrepreneurs in each country increases, the mass of varieties available goes down. Dixit-
Stiglitz love for variety implies then that lower \openness" lowers eciency. Notice that this
decrease in variety is a direct consequence of the entrepreneurs being less productive (and thus
requiring more workers) in an economy with high learning costs. Openness (low learning costs)
is (behind the veil of ignorance) welfare improving because it improves the allocation of talent.
7 Concluding remarks
This paper rst presents empirical evidence on the positive eect of cross-country proximity in
\entrepreneurial environments" on bilateral FDI ows. By exploiting the OECD International
Direct Investment Statistics and data on nationwide regulation levels from the OECD and the
World Bank, we nd evidence that smaller dierences in regulations across countries tend to
be associated with larger bilateral ows of FDI, after controlling for the level of regulation, for
countries xed eects and for time eects, in the context of a standard gravity model.
Motivated by this evidence, we build a general equilibrium model that { while consistent with
the main stylized facts about FDI { allows to study the distributional eects of globalization.
In the model, agents are heterogeneous and dier both in their ability to be entrepreneurs or
workers and their nationality. Entrepreneurs may set up a rm abroad, i.e. engage in FDI. If
they do so they incur in two additional costs, one of which is the cost of learning how the foreign
environment works. In this framework, globalization fosters FDI and improves the allocation of
talents in the economy boosting wages, output, and productivity.
The mechanism is as follows. Only the more able entrepreneurs engage in FDI, and their
fraction grows larger the \easier" it is to set up a rm abroad, i.e. the more similar the domestic
and foreign entrepreneurial environments. This, in turn, increases the demand for domestic
labor, output and wages. As a consequence, the minimum ability level needed to become an
entrepreneur goes up. This implies that the size of the pool of entrepreneurs goes down while
its composition changes: a greater proportion engages in FDI. Hence, globalization improves
the allocation of talent of the economy because the increase in the wage rate dissuades low-
ability people from becoming entrepreneurs. At the same time, even if less people opt for
an entrepreneurial career, a larger fraction serve clients abroad, implying that the variety of
products that costumers may acquire increases.
The model implies that high- and low-ability agents are better o in a globalized universe,
i.e. in a world where learning costs are lower. The reason is that low-ability agents, who decide
to become workers, earn higher wages in a globalized environment, whereas high-ability agents
can exploit larger investment opportunities. Medium-ability agents, dierently, prefer to live in
34The four functions object of this discussion (wage rate, local entrepreneurs prots, multinational entrepreneurs
prots, and prots of becoming a multinational entrepreneur) are plotted in gure 4 for the agent with  =
1
2
(with  = 1:1).
25a national universe where they are sheltered from foreign competition.
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which implies that C < 1 and  + 1 > 2, therefore 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Proof. Next, we prove that
@w(C)
@C < 0, where












@ (1 +    C)
q
(1 +  + 2C)
2   12
 1







Which is negative if




















(1 + )C (18)
28Which is true since (1 + )
2 must be smaller than (1 + ZA)
2 = 5:6997 and the right hand side is
larger than 6.
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the above expression is negative since, as shown above:
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Table 2: Correlations between the OECD Regulation Subindexes
PMR State B. Ent. B. T&I Ec. reg. Ad. reg. Inw. Outw.
PMR 1
State Control 0.86 1
Bar. Entrep. 0.54 0.42 1
Bar. T&I 0.76 0.45 0.03 1
Econ. reg. 0.84 0.98 0.47 0.4 1
Admin. reg. 0.49 0.36 0.97 0.01 0.38 1
Inward reg. 0.85 0.89 0.79 0.37 0.90 0.73 1
Outward reg. 0.82 0.52 0.1 0.99 0.47 0.08 0.40 1
31Table 3: Variables of the World Bank dataset Doing Business 2004
Starting a Business Number of procedures
Average time spent during each procedure (in calendar days)
Ocial cost of each procedure (% of income per capita)
Paid-in minimum capital (as a percentage of income per capita)
Hiring and Firing Diculty of hiring index
Rigidity of hours index
Diculty of ring index
Rigidity of employment (average of the three above)
Firing costs (number of weeks)
Registering Property Number of procedures
Number of days
Ocial cost (% of property value per capita)
Getting Credit Cost to create and register collateral (% of income per capita)
Index of legal rights of borrowers and lenders
Index of credit information availability
Coverage of public registry (borrowers per 1000 capita)
Coverage of private registry (borrowers per 1000 capita)
Protecting Investors Disclosure of ownership and nancial information index
Enforcing Contracts Number of procedures
Number of days
Ocial cost (% of the debt value)
Closing a Business Number of years
Ocial cost (% of estate)
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































36Table 8: \Beta" Coecients.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Beta Coes
Dependent variable
FDI Inows (share of host country GDP) 3713 0.00077 0.00232
Distance in regulation
OECD variables
Product Market Regulation 3713 0.62893 0.47054 -0.0439
State control 3713 1.09550 0.7763 -0.0484
Barriers to Entrepreneurship 3713 0.81336 0.56037 -0.0781
Barriers to Trade and Investment 3713 0.59838 0.61986 -0.0897
Economic Regulation 3713 0.89041 0.6468 -0.0634
Administrative Regulation 3713 1.0114 0.66697 -0.0626
Overall inward-oriented regulation 3713 0.85109 0.6123 -0.0747
Overall outward-oriented regulation 3713 0.55416 0.55855 -0.0847
Starting a business
N. of procedures 3713 3.36386 2.5742 -0.0364
Number of days 3713 24.37 27.59 -0.0573
Cost (% of income per capita) 3713 8.533 7.8186 -0.0499
Minimum capital (% of income per capita) 3713 36.733 39.549 -0.0225
Hiring and ring
Diculty of hiring index 3713 29.380 22.694 -0.0386
Rigidity of hours index 3713 27.606 22.397 -0.0837
Diculty of ring index 3713 19.504 15.955 -0.0444
Rigidity of employment (average of the three) 3713 24.197 16.947 -0.0483
Firing costs (number of weeks) 3713 29.046 28.587 -0.0412
Registering a property
N. of procedures 3713 3.1023 2.4196 -0.0387
Number of days 3713 51.922 63.134 -0.0359
Ocial cost (% of property value per capita) 3713 3.8360 3.2295 -0.0142
Getting credit
Cost of collateral (% of income per capita) 3713 7.0121 7.1774 -0.0085
Index of legal rights of borrowers and lenders 3713 2.6073 1.9637 -0.0514
Index of credit information availability 3713 1.1053 0.86101 -0.0224
Coverage of public registry 3713 132.3 204.81 -0.0330
Coverage of private registry 3713 460.01 349.15 -0.0334
Protecting investors
Disclosure of ownership and nancial info 3713 1.1664 0.9665 -0.0280
Enforcing contracts
N. of procedures 3713 5.801 4.419 -0.0442
Number of days 3713 253.60 368.99 -0.1000
Ocial cost (% of debt value) 3713 5.1653 3.4790 0.0159
Closing a business
Number of years 3713 1.0935 0.94187 0.0372
Ocial cost (% of estate) 3713 4.5354 4.303592 -0.0168
























(b) Small learning costs: (γ + C < ZA)












Figure 3: Eﬀects of openness (lower C) on gross proﬁts, wages and output. (γ = 1.1).
Figure 4: Eﬀects of openness (lower C) for the median agent (φ = 1
2) on wages (dotted line),
net proﬁts from domestic activity (diamond line), net proﬁts from foreign activity (solid line),
net proﬁts from starting a foreign activity (thick solid line). (γ = 1.1).
38C A two-sector model with tradable goods
The model described in the main text is highly stilyzed. Among the many simplications, we have also assumed
tradable goods away. This, however, implies that multinational entrepreneurs cannot consume the prots earned
abroad. In this appendix we show that adding a perfectly competitive sector of tradable goods, while addressing
this problem, does not change the main results of the analysis.
This appendix also further generalizes the model by relaxing the assumption that entrepreneurial talent is
uniformly distributed and allows   0 to be distributed according to any cumulative distribution function F ().
C.1 The closed economy equilibrium
Assume the existence of a perfectly competitive sector where perfectly homogeneous tradable goods are produced.
Labor is the only input and the production function in the tradable sector is q = L. The tradable good enters
symmetrically in the Dixit-Stiglitz preferences of the agents so that its demand is q = Y p
 
q , where the numeraire
is, as in the main text, the price index of non-tradable goods.
In equilibrium pq =
w
 must hold. Being the supply of good q innitely elastic at pq =
w
, the quantity
produced in the tradable sector is determined by consumers' product demand. Therefore, the demand for labor








 . Assuming, as in the main text,  = 2 we have
that:
Lq (z) = 
Y
w2 = z (19)
We can now derive the aggregate labor demand equal to the sum of the demand for labor in the tradable and
non tradable sectors. From (7) and (19) we have that:








From (20) the labor demand may be rewritten as follows:
LD (z) =

z If z  1
z + F (z   1)  z +
R z 1
0 dF () If 1  z
(21)
Thus, dierently from the case analyzed in the text, for z  1 the labor demand is not zero as some labor is hired
in order to produce tradable goods.
35 Of course, in any equilibrium where both tradables and non tradables are
produced, it must be that z > 1. Thus, being the labor supply LS (z) = 1 F(z 1) the labor market equilibrium
condition that pins down the value of z is:








Notice that the right hand side of (22) is continuously increasing in z and is equal to  if z = 1. Thus, provided that
 < 1, both tradables and non tradables are produced and the above equation uniquely identies the autarchic
equilibrium value of z denoted by ZA.
36
The goods market equilibrium condition, that allows to separately identify the equilibrium values of the wage
rate w and of the income Y , reads as follows.
Y = zw + 2F (z   1)zw (23)
Given that the value of z is pinned down by the labor market equilibrium condition, the above equation solves
for w:
wA = 2F (ZA   1) +  (24)
C.2 The open economy equilibrium
We solve for a symmetric steady state. When the economy is open the labor demand is given by the sum of the
demand for labor of domestic and foreign entrepreneurs. The labor demand of domestic entrepreneurs is as in
35Notice that we now allow for any   0, thus  is not constrained to be smaller than 1 as in the main text.











(z +  + )dF ()




As in the main text, an equilibrium with FDI requires 1   + C  z. In this case (which holds true if  + C is
low enough, namely  + C  ZA), the labor market clearing condition is:
















Also in the open economy case the right hand side of (26) is continuously increasing in z and is equal to  if
z = 1. Thus, again, provided that   1 the above equation uniquely identies the equilibrium value of z denoted
by Z
(C). Notice that the labor demand can never be smaller than in autarchy. As the supply of labor is not
aected by the possibility of cross-border investments, in any equilibrium with multinational entrepreneurs (i.e.,
whenever  + C < ZA), it follows that labor is now relatively more expensive, i.e. ZA  Z
(C).
Again, the goods market equilibrium condition allows to disentangle Y and w. The equilibrium condition
reads as follows:
Y = zw + 2zw[F (z   1) + F (z      C)] (27)
and therefore:
w
(C) = 2[F (Z
(C)   1) + F (Z
(C)      C)] +  (28)
A steady state with a lower C (more similar entrepreneurial environments) displays higher levels of w and Y .
The rst result follows directly from equation (28 from which it is apparent that the wage rate is increasing
in the fraction of (domestic and foreign) entrepreneurs, which in turn is decreasing in C.
37
The second statement must be true since both productivity (as a consequence of low talented entrepreneurs
exiting the market) and the fraction of workers goes up as C decreases. Thus, output must go up.
Finally, we cannot claim in full generality that in steady state a lower C implies lower gross prots
Y
w. This is
due to the fact that we abandon the assumption of linearity in the distribution of talents and allow for a general
CDF F(). This can be seen rewriting equation (27) as follows:
Y
w
= z [ + 2(F (z   1) + F (z      C))] (29)
Recall that, as C goes down, z decreases while the total number of entrepreneurs go up. Thus, two osetting forces
are at work in the right hand side of (29). In the model solved in the main text, with a linear F() and  = 0,
we are able to prove analytically that the negative eect prevails and
Y
w decreases as C goes down. While the
inclusion of the tradable sector is immaterial, the presence of an arbitrary CDF does not allow to get analytical
results. However, numerical results (available upon request) using dierent distribution functions (exponential,
gamma, half-logistic and others) show that
Y
w does go down when C goes down.
37Recall that a decrease in C raises the aggregate (i.e. the sum of domestic and foreign) labor demand,
while triggering a decrease in the number of domestic entrepreneurs and an increase in the number of foreign
entrepreneurs. For the overall labor demand to go up, it must be that the number of (very ecient) foreign
entrants is larger than the number of (inecient) domestic entrepreneurs leaving the market, because more
ecient entrepreneurs demand a lower amount of labor than inecient ones. Another way of seeing that a lower
C raises the mass of entrepreneurs is that the number of varieties increases.
40